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By the von Neumann min-max theorem, a two person zero sum game with
finitely many pure strategies has a unique value for each player (summing to zero) and
each player has a non-empty set of optimal mixed strategies. If the payoffs are indepen-
dent, identically distributed (iid) uniform (0,1) random variables, then with probability
one, both players have unique optimal mixed strategies utilizing the same number of
pure strategies with positive probability (Jonasson 2004). The pure strategies with pos-
itive probability in the unique optimal mixed strategies are called saddle squares. In
1957, Goldman evaluated the probability of a saddle point (a 1 by 1 saddle square),
which was rediscovered by many authors including Thorp (1979). Thorp gave two
proofs of the probability of a saddle point, one using combinatorics and one using a
beta integral. In 1965, Falk and Thrall investigated the integrals required for the prob-
abilities of a 2 by 2 saddle square for 2× n and m× 2 games with iid uniform (0,1)
payoffs, but they were not able to evaluate the integrals.
This dissertation generalizes Thorp’s beta integral proof of Goldman’s proba-
bility of a saddle point, establishing an integral formula for the probability that a m×n
game with iid uniform (0,1) payoffs has a k by k saddle square (k ≤ m,n). Addition-
ally, the probabilities of a 2 by 2 and a 3 by 3 saddle square for a 3× 3 game with iid
uniform(0,1) payoffs are found. For these, the 14 integrals observed by Falk and Thrall
are dissected into 38 disjoint domains, and the integrals are evaluated using the basic
properties of the dilogarithm function. The final results for the probabilities of a 2 by 2
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1.1 Overview of Game Theory
With their book “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” [MvN1980], first pub-
lished in 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern laid the foundation for the
study of optimal mixed strategies, value and utility theory, and bargaining and coalition
formation for games of strategy with p≥ 2 players. For a play of the game, each player
simultaneously announces a pure strategy chosen from their set of pure strategies; each
player then receives a payoff determined by the pure strategies chosen by all of the
players. If the sum of the payoffs is always zero, then we say that the game is a zero
sum game. A nonzero sum game can be embedded in a larger zero sum game by adding
a fictitious player who has one pure strategy and whose payoff is minus the sum of the
payoffs of the players of the original game. See APPENDIX A for examples of zero
sum games of strategy with finitely many pure strategies.
The celebrated min-max theorem, first proved by von Neumann [vN1928],
states that for a two person zero sum game with finitely many pure strategies, there
is a unique value for each player and these two values sum to zero. A mixed strategy
for a player is an assignment of probabilities, which sum to one, to the player’s set of
pure strategies. Each player has a non-empty set of optimal mixed strategies which
maximize their expectation given that their opponent knows their mixed strategy. If
either player uses any optimal mixed strategy, then their expectation is greater than or
equal to their value of the game regardless of their opponent’s mixed strategy. Dantzig
[Dan1963] developed the simplex method (see APPENDIX B) which is often used by
government planners, business operators, and many others to solve linear optimization
problems which include applying the von Neumann min-max theorem to large eco-
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nomic games with two interests.
John Nash [Nas1951] and Lloyd S. Shapley [Sha2004] gave two important the-
orems which partially extend the von Neumann min-max theorem to zero sum games
with p ≥ 3 players. Nash [Nas1951] used Brower’s fixed point theorem [Bro1910]
to show the existence of an equilibrium point: a mixed strategy for each player such
that no player can increase their expectation by using a different mixed strategy. The
players may have different expectations for different Nash equilibrium points. Shapley
[Sha2004] gave an axiomatic development of a unique value for each player deter-
mined by the characteristic function of a game: a superadditive real valued function on
the collection of all subsets of the players. Each player may have no mixed strategy
which ensures that their expectation is greater than or equal to their Shapley value even
though all of the mixed strategies of their opponents are known. See APPENDIX A for
a zero sum three player coin matching game which illustrates these limitations of the
Nash equilibrium point theorem and Shapley’s unique value theorem.
While a great part of the research in the last sixty years has focused on coali-
tion formation, bargaining, utility theory and other modern concepts, a few researchers
have focused on the structure of the solutions of von Neumann and Nash for games of
strategy with random payoffs.
A. J. Goldman [Gol1957] gave the probability that an m× n matrix, where
m,n ≥ 1 and whose entries are independent, identically distributed (iid) random vari-
ables (rvs) from a continuous distribution, has a saddle point: an entry which is the
minimum of its row and the maximum of its column. If the random m×n matrix is the
payoff matrix for a two person zero sum game (see [PZ1996]), then Goldman’s theo-
rem gives the probability that both players have a unique optimal pure strategy, which
we refer to as a 1 by 1 saddle square.
R. M. Thrall and J. E. Falk [FT1965], Edward O. Thorp [Tho1979] and G. P.
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Papavassilopoulos [Pap1995] rediscovered Goldman’s theorem and its simple proof.
Thorp also gave an alternative proof of Goldman’s theorem using the gamma function
and the beta integral [Tho1979].
William G. Faris and Robert S. Maier [FM1987] consider random two person
zero sum games in which both players have n pure strategies and the payoffs are iid rvs
from a continuous distribution with certain other properties. Faris and Maier observe
that Goldman’s saddle point probability tends to 0 as n tends to infinity. Additionally,
Faris and Maier show that if the payoffs have a normal distribution, then the probability
that all pure strategies occur with positive probability in an optimal mixed strategy,
which we call an n by n saddle square, is bounded above by 21−n. Faris and Maier
also investigated the distribution of the number of pure strategies which occur with
positive probability in an optimal mixed strategy when n is large and the payoffs have
a Gaussian or uniform distribution.
Johan Jonasson [Jon2004] extended the results of Faris and Maier [FM1987]
and proved an important theorem: if the payoffs in a two person zero sum game with
finitely many strategies are iid rvs from a continuous distribution, then with probability
1 (wp1) both players have a unique optimal mixed strategy, and the number of pure
strategies which occur with positive probability in both optimal mixed strategies are
the same. Jonasson proved that for an n×n two person zero sum game with iid payoffs
from a standard normal distribution, the expected number of pure strategies occuring
with positive probability in both players’ unique optimal mixed strategies is n/2+o(n).
In the Spring 2005 semester, my advisor, Kevin W. J. Kadell, gave a MAT/STP
598 course in game theory. He demonstrated that Jonasson’s theorem [Jon2004] fol-
lows by examining the final tableau obtained by applying the simplex method to find
optimal strategies for both players. We use the term “saddle square” to describe the
unique optimal mixed strategies which occur wp1 by Jonasson’s theorem, which are
the object of study in this dissertation.
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A number of researchers have shown that, unlike random two person zero sum
games, the limit of the probability of a 1 by 1 saddle square in two person nonzero
sum games is 1− 1/e, as the number of pure strategies for both players tends to in-
finity. Goldman, K. Goldberg and M. Newman [GGN1968] first proved this in 1968.
Melvin Dresher [Dre1970] extended the result of Goldman, Goldberg, and Newman
to all nonzero sum games with p ≥ 2 players. G. P. Papavassilopoulos [Pap1995] re-
discovered the results of Goldman, Goldberg, Newman and Dresher and added the
probability of a pure equilibrium solution in a random p person nonzero sum game
with the number of strategies fixed for each player tends to 0 as p tends to infinity.
This dissertation studies the structure of optimal mixed strategies for two per-
son zero sum games with finitely many pure strategies with a random payoff matrix
whose entries are iid uniform (0,1) rvs. We study the number of pure strategies which
occur with positive probability in the optimal mixed strategies given by the von Neu-
mann min-max theorem. We generalize Thorp’s [Tho1979] second proof of Goldman’s
theorem [Gol1957], finding the probability that a random uniform (0,1) payoff matrix
A with m,n ≥ 2 has a 2 by 2 saddle square. This means that both players have one
optimal mixed strategy which uses exactly two of their pure strategies.
1.2 The von Neumann Min-Max Theorem




∣∣ ∀i ∈ [m], ∀ j ∈ [n], ai, j ∈ S}, m,n≥ 1, S⊆ R,
where ∀ is an abbreviation of for all, [k] = {1, . . . ,k} for a positive integer k, and R is
the set of real numbers.
We follow the standard setup [PZ1996] of a two person zero sum game with
finitely many pure strategies, represented by the payoff matrix A ∈ Mm,n(R). Both
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players simultaneously announce their choices of pure strategies i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], then
player I recieves a payoff of ai, j units, and player II recieves a payoff of −ai, j units. If
ai, j > 0 then player I receives ai, j units from player II. If ai, j < 0 then player II receives
−ai, j units from player I. If ai, j = 0 then there is no payoff to either player.
The mixed strategy spaces for players I and II are given by
P=
{
p˜= (p1, . . . , pm)







q˜= (q1, . . . ,qn)
∣∣∣ 0≤ q1, . . . ,qn, ∑
j∈[n]
q j = 1
}
.
Note that pi and q j are the probabilities that player I chooses pure strategy i ∈ [m] and
player II chooses pure strategy j ∈ [n], respectively. For any two mixed strategies p˜∈ P
and q˜ ∈ Q, the expected payoff is




pi ai, j q j, p˜ ∈ P, q˜ ∈ Q.
It is a standard result of real analysis (see H. L. Royden [Roy1988]) that a
continuous function, such as (p˜, q˜) −→ p˜A q˜ᵀ, on a compact set
P×Q= {(p˜, q˜) ∣∣ p˜ ∈ P, q˜ ∈ Q},
with the product topology, is bounded above and below and attains its maximum and



















∣∣∣ ∀q˜ ∈ Q, p˜A q˜ᵀ ≥ vmaxmin(A)}, (1.2.2)
and note





















∣∣∣ ∀p˜ ∈ P, p˜A q˜ᵀ ≤ vminmax(A)}, (1.2.5)
and also note
Qopt(A) 6=∅, A ∈Mm,n(R). (1.2.6)
Observe by (1.2.1) and (1.2.4) that
vmaxmin(A)≤ vminmax(A).
The essential part of the von Neumann min-max theorem is given by the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 1.2.1. von Neumann’s min-max theorem [vN1928, MvN1980]. If
A ∈Mm,n(R) is the payoff matrix for a two person zero sum game, then
vmaxmin(A) = vminmax(A).
By Theorem 1.2.1,
∀p˜ ∈ Popt(A) and ∀q˜ ∈ Qopt(A),








A∼UNm,n(0,1) iff A ∈Mm,n(0,1) and the entries of A are iid un(0,1) rvs,
where un(0,1) denotes the uniform distribution on the interval (0,1). Similarly for
comparisons in Chapter 4 we define
A∼ EXm,n(1) iff A ∈Mm,n(0,∞) and the entries of A are iid ex(1) rvs,
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where ex(1) denotes the exponential distribution with single parameter 1, and
A∼ Nm,n(0,1) iff A ∈Mm,n(−∞,∞) and the entries of A are iid n(0,1) rvs,
where n(0,1) denotes the standard normal distribution.
Definition 1.3.1. The entry ai, j of A ∈ Mm,n(R) where i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], m,n ≥ 1, is a
saddle point of A iff
a1, j, . . . , ai−1, j,ai+1, j, . . . , am, j ≤ ai, j ≤ ai,1, . . . , ai, j−1, ai, j+1, . . . , ai,n. (1.3.1)
A. J. Goldman [Gol1957] established the following theorem which gives the
probability that A∼UNm,n(0,1) has a saddle point.
Theorem 1.3.2. Goldman’s theorem [Gol1957].
S1(m,n) = Prob
(




(m+n−1)! , m,n≥ 1.
(1.3.2)
1.4 Jonasson’s Theorem
Johan Jonasson [Jon2004] established the following theorem which characterizes
Popt(A) and Qopt(A) over random two person zero sum games with finitely many pure
strategies.
Theorem 1.4.1. Jonasson’s theorem [Jon2004]. If A∼UNm,n(0,1) is the payoff matrix











where both p˜Opt and q˜Opt require, with positive probability, the same number of pure






∣∣∣ the conclusion (1.4.1), (1.4.2)
of Jonasson’s Theorem 1.4.1 holds
}
.
Following Theorem 1.3.2 and Theorem 1.4.1 we establish the following definitions.













A has a k by k saddle square
∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1)),
1≤ k ≤ m,n.
Observe that Goldman’s Theorem 1.3.2 can be written as
S1(m,n) = Prob
(
∃i ∈ [m] with Popt = {(01, . . . ,0i−1,1,0i+1, . . . ,0m)},
∃ j ∈ [n] with Qopt = {(01, . . . ,0 j−1,1,0 j+1, . . . ,0n)},∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1))
=
m!n!
(m+n−1)! , m,n≥ 1.
This dissertation concerns the value of the saddle square probabilities Sk(m,n)
when A ∼UNm,n(0,1). Specifically we will compute S2(2,n), S2(m,2), S2(3,3) and
S3(3,3). In Chapter 2 we present two proofs of Goldman’s Theorem 1.3.2, the first
based on basic combinatorial analysis and the second using the beta integral and gamma
function. Chapter 3 generalizes the second proof of Goldman’s Theorem 1.3.2, ex-
pressing Sk(m,n) as a function of the expected value of probabilities Θ(A) and Φ(A).
Following the establishment of Sk(m,n) in Chapter 4 we derive algebraic formulas for
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Θ(A) and Φ(A) for k= 2 and present the integral form of S2(m,n) for A∼UN2,2(0,1).
We conclude Chapter 4 finding expressions for Θ(A) and Φ(A) for k = 2 when the en-
tries of matrix A are iid rvs from two alternative distributions, exponential (1) (A ∼
EX2,2(1)) and normal (0,1) (A ∼ N2,2(0,1)), demonstrating with a large simulation
the dependence of Θ(A)Φ(A) on the choice of the underlying distribution. Chapter
5 presents the preliminaries neccessary for computing the integral form of S2(3,3).
The partial details of the integral computation are provided in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. We




2.1 Proof of Goldman’s Theorem
Recall the following from Chapter 1:
Definition 1.3.1
The entry ai, j of A ∈Mm,n(R) where i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], m,n≥ 1, is a saddle point of A iff
a1, j, . . . , ai−1, j, ai+1, j, . . . , am, j ≤ ai, j ≤ ai,1, . . . , ai, j−1, ai, j+1, . . . , ai,n,
Definition 1.4.3, setting k = 1
S1(m,n) = Prob
(
A has a saddle point








(m+n−1)! , 1≤ m,n.
Goldman [Gol1957] gave the following proof of his Theorem 1.3.2.
Proof. Assume throughout the proof that A ∈ Mm,n is an m by n random matrix, A ∼
UNm,n(0,1), m,n≥ 1. All events are conditioned on A∼UNm,n(0,1).
Observe by (1.3.1) each entry of A is equally likely to be a saddle point. By the
von Neumann min-max Theorem 1.2.1, all of the saddle points of A are equal. Since
the entries of A are distinct wp1, A has at most one saddle point, and the probability of
the event (1.3.1) is unchanged if strict inequalities are used. Hence,
S1(m,n) = mnProb
(






























whereLCA is the event
LCA : LEG< CORNER< ARM, (2.1.4)
with the set inequality
U <V iff ∀u ∈U, ∀v ∈V, u< v, U, V ⊆ R.
Since finitely many iid rvs from a continuous distribution are distinct wp1,
|HOOK|= m+n−1,
and using order statistics (see David [Dav1981]),
HOOK = {hk(1), . . . ,hk(m+n−1)}, 0< hk(1) < .. . < hk(m+n−1) < 1.
Observe
LCA iff L and C and A ,
whereL , C and A are the events
L : LEG =
{
hk(1), . . . ,hk(m−1)
}
,





A : ARM =
{
















































Substituting (2.1.6) into (2.1.3) provides the required result of Theorem 1.3.2.
Note the probabilities of events (2.1.5) are independent of the distribution of the
entries of A, thus this proof suffices for random games, whose entries are iid rvs from
any continuous distribution.
2.2 Thorp’s Alternative Proof of Goldman’s Theorem
Thorp [Tho1979] rediscovered Goldman’s Theorem 1.3.2 and its simple proof above,
and presented the following reformulation (idea credited to S. Karamardian) using the
gamma function and the beta integral.
Proof. Again, it is assumed throughout the proof that A∼UNm,n(0,1) where m,n≥ 1,




∣∣ u∼ un(0,1))= 1− t, 0< t < 1,
Φ(t) = Prob(u< t
∣∣ u∼ un(0,1))= t, 0< t < 1.
Recall the sets LEG, CORNER, ARM, and HOOK (2.1.2) and events LCA
(2.1.4), L , C , and A (2.1.5). Again note that the events LCA , L , C , and A are
12




∣∣∣L and A )= 1,
we have





∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)= Prob(a2,1, . . . ,am,1 < t ∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)
= Prob
(
a2,1 < t and . . . and am,1 < t
∣∣∣ a1,1 = t).
Since ai, j, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], are iid un(0,1) rvs,
Prob
(
a2,1 < t and . . . and am,1 < t




∣∣∣ a1,1 = t) · · ·Prob(am,1 < t ∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)
=Φ(t)m−1






∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)= Prob(t < a1,2, . . . ,a1,n ∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)
= Prob
(
t < a1,2 and . . . and t < a1,n




∣∣∣ a1,1 = t) · · ·Prob(t < a1,n ∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)
=Θ(t)n−1




∣∣∣ a1,1 = t and A ∣∣∣ a1,1 = t are independent, 0< t < 1. (2.2.4)








∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)Prob(A ∣∣∣ a1,1 = t)
= tm−1(1− t)n−1, 0< t < 1.
(2.2.5)
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tm−1(1− t)n−1 dt. (2.2.6)








tx−1(1− t)y−1 dt = Γ(x)Γ(y)
Γ(x+ y−1) , Re(x)> 0, Re(y)> 0.
Note the functional equation
Γ(x+1) = xΓ(x). (2.2.7)
Using the functional equation (2.2.7), the fact that Γ(1) = 1, and the convention 0!= 1,











(m+n−1)! , m,n≥ 1,







a1,1 . . . a1,`
...
...
ak,1 . . . ak,`
 , A ∈Mm,n(R), 1≤ k ≤ m, 1≤ `≤ n.
Observe by Jonasson’s Theorem 1.4.1 that
if A∼UNm,n(0,1), then wp1 A ∈M∗m,n(0,1).
Let
r(A) =
∣∣∣{i ∈ [m] ∣∣∣ pOpti > 0}∣∣∣= ∣∣∣ { j ∈ [n] ∣∣∣ qOptj > 0}∣∣∣, A ∈M∗m,n(0,1),
where p˜Opt and q˜Opt are the unique optimal strategies of the players.
Following Thorp’s alternative proof of Goldman’s Theorem 1.3.2 using the
























∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1))Prob(Ak,k remains a
k by k saddle square











Ak,k remains a k by k saddle square∣∣∣ r(Ak,k) = k, A∼UNm,n(0,1)), 1≤ k ≤ m,n.
(3.0.1)
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Given A∼UNm,n(0,1) and r(Ak,k) = k, the following three events are equivalent
E : Ak,k remains a k by k saddle square,
F : player I rejects his/her pure strategies k+1, . . . ,m, and
player II rejects his/her pure strategies k+1, . . . ,n,
G : (ai,1, . . . ,ai,k)q˜opt(Ak,k)ᵀ < v(Ak,k), k+1≤ i≤ m, and







pOpti (A)ui > v(A)





qOpti (A)ui < v(A)
∣∣∣∣ u1, . . . ,uk iid un(0,1)),
A ∈M∗k,k(0,1).
(3.0.3)
Using the independence of events in G (3.0.2), we reformulate
Prob
(
Ak,k remains a k by k saddle square
∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k)
= Prob
(
(ak+1,1, . . . ,ak+1,k)q˜opt(Ak,k)ᵀ < v(Ak,k)
∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k) · · ·
Prob
(
(am,1, . . . ,am,k)q˜opt(Ak,k)ᵀ < v(Ak,k)
∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k)
×Prob
(
p˜opt(Ak,k)ᵀ(a1,k+1, . . . ,ak,k+1)> v(Ak,k)
∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k) · · ·
Prob
(
p˜opt(Ak,k)ᵀ(a1,n, . . . ,ak,n)> v(Ak,k)




∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k)
×Φm−k(Ak,k ∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k). (3.0.4)












∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k)
×Φm−k(Ak,k ∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1), r(Ak,k) = k), 1≤ k ≤ m,n. (3.0.5)
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Note Θ(A) and Φ(A), when conditioned on A ∼ UNk,k(0,1), r(A) = k as in

















∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n, r(A) = k),














where the element of probability, dµ(A), is the k2 dimensional Lebesgue measure (see




























Proof. Let A∼UN2,n(0,1). By Theorem 1.4.1, we have 1≤ r(A)≤ 2 and hence
1 = S1(2,n)+S2(2,n). (4.1.1)
Solving (4.1.1) for S2(2,n) and using Theorem 1.3.2, we obtain













as required by Lemma 4.1.1.
We use Lemma 4.1.1 to find the marginal distributions ofΘ(A) andΦ(A), where






























































Let X ∼ beta(2,2). The density function of X
fX(t) = 6t(1− t), 0< t < 1,
















Using the marginal distributions of Θ(A) and Φ(A) for A∼UN2,n(0,1), r(A) =
2, we find bounds for S2(3,3). From (4.1.3) and (4.1.4) we have, conditioning on
19
























































































S1(3,3)+S2(3,3)+S3(3,3) = 1. (4.1.9)
We solve for an upper bound for S2(3,3).





























Solving for S2(4,4) and using Theorem 1.3.2
S2(4,4) = 1−S1(4,4)−S3(4,4)−S4(4,4) = 1− 435 −S3(4,4)−S4(4,4)< 31/35,










































4.2 Saddle Point Conditions





Following from Definition 1.3.1 and the proof of Theorem 1.3.2 we see that
a is a saddle point iff c< a< b
b is a saddle point iff d < b< a
c is a saddle point iff a< c< d
d is a saddle point iff b< d < c

. (4.2.2)
Using (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) we obtain
r(A) = 2 iff {a,d}< {b,c} or {b,c}< {a,d}.
21
Thus, the exsistence of a saddle point is completely determined by the order
statistics of the entries of A. That is, A ∼UNm,n(0,1) has a saddle point iff the matrix
of the ranks of the entries of A has a saddle point. Unfortunately, Maple 13 simulation
quickly reveals that this fails to give Sk(m,n) when k ≥ 2 and m,n≥ 3.








, α ≤ β ≤ γ ≤ δ .
Given S = {α,β ,γ,δ} with 0< α < β < γ < δ < 1, there are 4! equally likely possi-
































































































dµ(A) = dα dβ dγ dδ .
For the multiple integral in (4.3.1) we observe geometrically (Figure 4.1) the




1 ⇐⇒ pOpt1 > v(A) and pOpt2 > v(A)
2 ⇐⇒ pOpt1 > v(A) and pOpt2 < v(A)
3 ⇐⇒ pOpt1 < v(A) and pOpt2 > v(A)





1 ⇐⇒ qOpt1 > v(A), and qOpt2 > v(A)
2 ⇐⇒ qOpt1 > v(A), and qOpt2 < v(A)
3 ⇐⇒ qOpt1 < v(A), and qOpt2 > v(A)
4 ⇐⇒ qOpt1 < v(A), and qOpt2 < v(A)

. (4.3.3)
Of the 42 cases given above, only 14 are possible since casa(A) = 1 and

































Figure 4.1: For A ∼UN2,2(0,1), Θ(A) is the area above pOpt1 u1 + pOpt2 u2 = v(A) and
Φ(A) is the area below qOpt1 u1+q
Opt
2 u2 = v(A).
For each representative in (4.2.4), using formulas (B.0.3), (B.0.4), (B.0.5), we can ex-






2 , and v(A) in terms of α,β ,γ,δ . Further examination of
the expressions with 0 < α < β < γ < δ < 1 reveals only 6 cases of the 14 possi-
ble for each representative. Furthermore, observe by the inherent symmetry the set
{pOpt1 , pOpt2 ,qOpt1 ,qOpt2 } together and v(A) are invarient over the set (4.2.4) of equally
likely representatives. More specifically, swapping rows of A will switch pOpt1 and p
Opt
2 ,
swapping columns of A will switch qOpt1 and q
Opt
2 , and swapping rows for columns in
A will switch {pOpt1 ,pOpt2 } for {qOpt1 ,qOpt2 }. Hence it is sufficient to consider a single
representative of (4.2.4) to compute integral (4.3.1).
For the remainder of this Chapter we will consider the following representative




 , 0< α < β < γ < δ < 1. (4.3.4)
Using formulas (B.0.3), (B.0.4), and (B.0.5) with A in (4.3.4) we have
pOpt1 =
γ−β




δ −α+ γ−β ,
qOpt1 =
δ −β




δ −α+ γ−β ,
v(A) =
γδ −αβ
δ −α+ γ−β .
(4.3.5)
Substituting (4.3.5) into Definition 4.3.1 and simplifying the system of inequalities, we
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find
casa(A) = maison(A) = 1 ⇐⇒ γδ −αβ < γ−β (4.3.6)
casa(A) = 3, maison(A) = 1 ⇐⇒ γ−β < γδ −αβ <min(δ −β ,γ−α)
(4.3.7)
casa(A) = 3, maison(A) = 2 ⇐⇒ γ−α < γδ −αβ < δ −β (4.3.8)
casa(A) = 3, maison(A) = 3 ⇐⇒ δ −β < γδ −αβ < γ−α (4.3.9)
casa(A) = 3, maison(A) = 4 ⇐⇒ max(δ −β ,γ−α)< γδ −αβ < δ −α
(4.3.10)
casa(A) = maison(A) = 4 ⇐⇒ δ −α < γδ −αβ (4.3.11)





2 (A)u2 > v(A)





2 (A)u2 < v(A)
∣∣∣∣ u1,u2 iid un(0,1)), (4.3.12)
Using simple geometry, (4.3.12), and expressions (4.3.5) we obtain the following for-
mulas for Θ(A) and Φ(A) required for the 6 cases of (4.3.6) to (4.3.11).
Θ1(A) = 1− (γδ −αβ )
2
2(γ−β )(δ −α)
Θ3(A) = 1− 2(γδ −αβ )− γ+β2(δ −α)
Θ4(A) =






2(γδ −αβ )− γ+α
2(δ −β )
Φ3(A) =
2(γδ −αβ )−δ +β
2(γ−α)
Φ4(A) = 1− (γ−α+δ −β − γδ +αβ )
2




In this section, we compute formulas for Θ(A) and Φ(A) when A ∼ EX2,2(1) and A ∼
N2,2(0,1). Although our main focus is S2(m,n) for A∼UN2,2(0,1), we investigate the
dependence of Θ(A)Φ(A) on the chosen distribution of the entries of A.










2 (A)u2 > v(A)





2 (A)u2 < v(A)
∣∣∣∣ u1,u2 iid ex(1)), (4.4.1)


























With the joint exponential probability density function with parameters (1,1)
fEX(x,y) = e−xe−y 0< x, 0< y,
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Again, assuming A∈ TwoByTwo as (4.3.4) and letting A∼N2,2(0,1),Θ(A) and





2 (A)u2 > v(A)





2 (A)u2 < v(A)
∣∣∣∣ u1,u2 iid n(0,1)). (4.4.5)








−∞< x< ∞, −∞< y< ∞,
we have the following two cases.
v(A)> 0 :
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Using the same boundary points of (4.4.2) we find orthogonal distances to lines ux+














































































where FN(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
v(A)< 0 :
Following from (4.4.6), (4.4.7), and (4.4.8)
Θ(A) = 1−FN(−hΘ) (4.4.9)
and
Φ(A) = FN(−hΦ). (4.4.10)
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4.5 Confidence Intervals
Monte-Carlo simulations using Maple 13 were performed with payoff matrix entries
distributed as iid un(0,1), ex(1), and n(0,1). Note from Chapters 1 and 2 we see The-
orem 1.3.2 and Theorem 1.4.1 hold as long as the entries of A are iid rvs from some
continuous distribution. Thus Lemma 4.1.1, the subsequent results (4.1.3) and (4.1.4),





forΘ(A) andΦ(A) defined in (4.4.1) and (4.4.5). Hence we construct large sample nor-


























X ∼ N(0,1), Prob(X < z0.005)= 0.995.
Large samples of 108 observations were used to compute the following 99%
confidence intervals
A∼UN2,2(0,1), Θ(A)Φ(A) : (0.2006010062, 0.2006295257), (4.5.1)
A∼ EX2,2(1), Θ(A)Φ(A) : (0.2002027093, 0.2002312857), (4.5.2)
A∼ N2,2(0,1), Θ(A)Φ(A) : (0.2002259383, 0.2002538277). (4.5.3)





is dependent on the distribution of the entries of A. Additional
comparisons can be made with the following plots (Figures 4.2 to 4.4) of the support
boundary of the joint distribution of Θ(A) and Φ(A) for each of the underlying distri-
butions.
29
Figure 4.2: Support boundary for joint distribution of Θ(A) and Φ(A) for
A∼UN2,2(0,1).
Figure 4.3: Support boundary for joint distribution of Θ(A) and Φ(A) for
A∼ EX2,2(1).
30






We begin with defining the following integrals with payoff matrix representative A ∈






















































Θ4(A)mΦ4(A)n dα dβ dγ dδ . (5.1.6)
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Consider the bijective transformation
T : (a,b,c,d,) −→ (e, f ,g,h) by
e= 1−d,
f = 1− c,
g= 1−b,
h= 1−a.
Transformation T preserves uniform(0,1) iid rvs. If
a,b,c,d iid∼ un(0,1)
then
h,g, f ,e iid∼ un(0,1).
Furthermore
a< b< c< d =⇒ e< f < g< h.
Recall the six cases (4.3.6) to (4.3.11) of the representative payoff matrix in
TwoByTwo (4.3.4). Substituting α = 1−θ , β = 1−η , γ = 1− ζ , and δ = 1− ε we
find
0< α < β < γ < δ < 1 T=⇒ 0< ε < ζ < η < θ < 1, (5.1.7)
γδ −αβ < γ−β T=⇒ θ − ε < ηθ − εζ ,
γ−β < γδ −αβ <min(δ −β ,γ−α) T=⇒ max(θ −ζ ,η− ε)< ηθ − εζ < θ − ε,








=⇒ 1− (θ −ζ − (ηθ − εζ )+η− ε)
2
2(η−ζ )(θ − ε) = 1−Θ4(A),
Θ3(A) = 1− 2(γδ −αβ )− γ+β2(δ −α)
T
=⇒ (ηθ − εζ )
(θ − ε) −
(η−ζ )
2(θ − ε) = 1−Θ3(A),
Φ2(A) =
2(γδ −αβ )− γ+α
2(δ −β )
T
=⇒ 1− 2(ηθ − εζ )−θ +ζ





=⇒ (θ −ζ − (ηθ − εζ )+η− ε)
2
2(η− ε)(θ −ζ ) =Φ4(A).
(5.1.9)
The Jacobian determinant of T is∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 −1
0 0 −1 0
0 −1 0 0
−1 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 1. (5.1.10)
Observe by setting m= n= 1 in (5.1.1) we have, following (5.1.8), (5.1.9),























dα dβ dγ dδ .
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dα dβ dγ dδ
=A (1,1)−A (1,0)−A (0,1)+A (0,0).
(5.1.11)
Expressions for D(1,1) and E (1,1) follow similarly.
D(1,1) = C (1,1)−C (1,0)−C (0,1)+C (0,0),
E (1,1) =B(1,1)−B(1,0)−B(0,1)+B(0,0).
(5.1.12)
We now turn our focus to computing S2(3,3). From (4.3.1) with m= n= 3 we
have the integral ∫∫∫∫
A∈M∗2,2(0,1)
r(A)=2
Θ(A)Φ(A) dα dβ dγ dδ . (5.1.13)
Following from Chapter 4, representative (4.3.4), definitions (5.1.1) to (5.1.6), and re-
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sults (5.1.11) and (5.1.12) we obtain∫∫∫∫
A∈M∗2,2(0,1)
r(A)=2















2A (1,1)−A (1,0)−A (0,1)+A (0,0)
+2B(1,1)−B(1,0)−B(0,1)+B(0,0)





In order to compute the integtrals of (5.1.14), we need to express the regions defined
in cases (4.3.6), (4.3.7), and (4.3.8) as limits of integration. Starting with casa(A) =
maison(A) = 1 we have
γδ −αβ < γ−β with 0< α < β < γ < δ < 1. (5.2.1)
To avoid quadratic solutions we choose the order of integration, from interior to exte-
rior, to be γ , β , δ , α . Solving the inequalites (5.2.1) for γ ,
β (1−α)





then we find limits for γ
β (1−α)
1−δ < γ < δ . (5.2.2)
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Continuing to β , the remaining inequalties from (5.2.2) and (5.2.3) are
β <
β (1−α)
1−δ < δ , α < β < δ .
Solving for β yields
β <
δ (1−δ )
1−α , α < β , β < δ .
Again it is clear that
δ (1−δ )
1−α < δ ,
and hence we find the limits for β
α < β <
δ (1−δ )
1−α . (5.2.3)
For δ the remaining inequalities are
α <
δ (1−δ )
1−α < δ , δ < 1.
Solving we find
α(1−α)< δ (1−δ ), α < δ , δ < 1. (5.2.4)
Examining (5.2.4) reveals limits for δ






Combining (5.2.2), (5.2.3), (5.2.5), and (5.2.6) we see (5.2.1) is equivalent to
β (1−α)
1−δ < γ < δ
α < β < δ (1−δ )1−α
α < δ < 1−α
0< α < 12
. (5.2.7)
For casa(A) = 3, maison(A) = 1, the system of inequalties becomes substan-
tially more complicated. We outline one iteration of the systematic technique used to
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find the limits of integration. Initial investigation indicates the integration order γ , β ,
α , δ , is best. From (4.3.8) we have
γ−β < γδ −αβ <min(δ −β ,γ−α) with 0< α < β < γ < δ < 1.
To begin solving we first recognize the following two cases
γ−β < γδ −αβ < δ −β , δ −β < γ−α with 0< α < β < γ < δ < 1, (5.2.8)
γ−β < γδ −αβ < γ−α, γ−α < δ −β with 0< α < β < γ < δ < 1. (5.2.9)
Solving (5.2.8) for γ we find
γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ , γ <
δ −β +αβ
δ
, δ −β +α < γ, β < γ, γ < δ . (5.2.10)
Considering all possible orderings in (5.2.10), there initially appears to be 2! ·3! distinct
limits for γ . Note the contradiction(
δ <
β (1−α)














δ (1−δ )< β (1−α) and β (1−α)< δ (1−δ )
)
.
Hence we have the following 4 orderings for (5.2.10), verified by simulation:
β < δ −β +α < γ < β (1−α)









δ −β +α < β < γ < β (1−α)









giving the following limits for γ
δ −β +α < γ < β (1−α)
1−δ ,
δ −β +α < γ < δ −β +αβ
δ
,
β < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ ,





We then proceed to β repeating the process for each system (5.2.11) to (5.2.14) with
α < β < δ .
Completion of the process outlined above yields limits for (5.2.8)
δ −β +α < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
δ+α
2
0< α < 1−2δ
1




β < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
δ+α
2 < β <
δ (1−δ )
1−α
0< α < 1−2δ
1




β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
δ (1−δ )
1−α < β <
δ
1−α+δ
0< α < 1−2δ
1




δ −β +α < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
δ+α
2
0< α < δ
0< δ < 13
,
β < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
δ+α
2 < β <
δ (1−δ )
1−α
0< α < δ
0< δ < 13
,
β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
δ (1−δ )
1−α < β <
δ
1−α+δ
0< α < δ
0< δ < 13
,
δ −β +α < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
δ (1−δ )
1−α
1−2δ < α < δ
1




δ −β +α < γ < δ−β+αβδ
δ (1−δ )
1−α < β <
δ+α
2
1−2δ < α < δ
1




β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
δ+α
2 < β <
δ
1−α+δ
1−2δ < α < δ
1




δ −β +α < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
δ (1−δ )
1−α
0< α < 1−δ
1
2 < δ < 1
,
δ −β +α < γ < δ−β+αβδ
δ (1−δ )
1−α < β <
δ+α
2
0< α < 1−δ
1
2 < δ < 1
,
β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
δ+α
2 < β <
δ
1−α+δ
0< α < 1−δ
1




Similarly for (5.2.9) we find limits
α(1−β )
1−δ < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ
α < β < α1−δ+α




2 < δ < 1
,
β < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
α
1−δ+α < β <
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ




2 < δ < 1
,
β < γ < δ −β +α
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
δ+α
2




2 < δ < 1
,
α(1−β )
1−δ < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ
α < β < α1−δ+α
0< α < δ





β < γ < β (1−α)1−δ
α
1−δ+α < β <
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ
0< α < δ





β < γ < δ −β +α
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
δ+α
2
0< α < δ






1−δ < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ
α < β < (δ+α)(1−δ )2−α+δ
(1−δ )2
2−δ < α < δ
2−√2





1−δ < γ < δ −β +α
(δ+α)(1−δ )




2−δ < α < δ
2−√2




β < γ < δ −β +α
α




2−δ < α < δ
2−√2





1−δ < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ
α < β < (δ+α)(1−δ )2−α+δ
(1−δ )2
2−δ < α < (1−δ )2
3−√5
2 < δ < 1
,
α(1−β )
1−δ < γ < δ −β +α
(δ+α)(1−δ )




2−δ < α < (1−δ )2
3−√5
2 < δ < 1
,
β < γ < δ −β +α
α




2−δ < α < (1−δ )2
3−√5
2 < δ < 1
,
α(1−β )
1−δ < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ
α < β < (δ+α)(1−δ )2−α+δ
(1−δ )2 < α < δ
3−√5





1−δ < γ < δ −β +α
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
α
1−δ+α
(1−δ )2 < α < δ
3−√5




β < γ < δ −β +α
α
1−δ+α < β <
δ+α
2
(1−δ )2 < α < δ
3−√5





1−δ < γ <
β (1−α)
1−δ
α < β < (δ+α)(1−δ )2−α+δ
(1−δ )2 < α < 1−δ
1
2 < δ < 1
,
α(1−β )
1−δ < γ < δ −β +α
(δ+α)(1−δ )
2−α+δ < β <
α
1−δ+α
(1−δ )2 < α < 1−δ
1
2 < δ < 1
,
β < γ < δ −β +α
α
1−δ+α < β <
δ+α
2
(1−δ )2 < α < 1−δ
1




Applying the solution process again to casa(A) = 3, maison(A) = 2, with 0 <
α < β < γ < δ < 1 and following order of integration γ , β , δ , α , region (4.3.8) becomes
β < γ < α(1−β )1−δ
α < β < α1−δ+α
α < δ < 1−α
0< α < 12
,
β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
α < β < δ1−α+δ
1−α < δ <√1−α
0< α < 12
,
β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
α < β < δ1−α+δ
1− α2 < δ < 1
0< α < 23
,
β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
α < β < δ1−α+δ√






β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
α < β < δ1−α+δ
α < δ < 1
2
3 < α < 1
,
β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
α < β < δ1−α+δ
α < δ < 1− α2√
5−1




β < γ < δ−β+αβδ
α < β < δ1−α+δ











Integration of (5.1.1), (5.1.2), (5.1.3), with m,n≤ 1, requires the use of the dilogrithm





, z ∈ C, |z|< 1.
We have the well known Taylor series




, z ∈ C, |z|< 1.
Using the principal branch of the complex logarithm function, we have the analytic
continuation
Li1(z) =− ln(1− z), z ∈ C− [1,∞)
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of Li1(z) to C− [1,∞), which is the complex plane cut from one to infinity. Observe






dt, z ∈ C− (1,∞), 2≤ s,
where the integral may be taken over any path which is contained in C− (1,∞), pro-
vides an analytic continuation of Lis(z) to C− (1,∞) which is the complex plane cut
from one to infinity with one included.
For our purposes we require some special properties of the dilogrithm Li2(z)






dt, x≤ 1. (5.3.1)












Li2(x)+Li2(1− x) = pi
2
6















, −1< x< 1.
(5.3.2)

























We are ready to proceed in finding S2(3,3) by computing integrals A (0,0), A (1,0),
A (0,1), A (1,1), B(0,0), B(1,0), B(0,1), B(1,1), C (0,0), C (1,0), C (0,1), and
C (1,1) given by (5.1.1), (5.1.2), and (5.1.3). Note, while invariably long and tedious,
all functions have real valued antiderivates (utilizing the dilogartihm for x≤ 1), and the
integration is carried out by the fundamental theroem of calculus. Maple 13 integration
and simplification routines were utilitzed extensively to mitigate errors and speed the
computation. Also note the author found it neccessary to write several special routines,
as the standard Maple 13 routines were often unsuccessful.
In the following chapters we present an outline of the computations for each
of the integrals and state the remaining results. Chapter 6 covers the computation of
A (m,n) for m,n≤ 1. Chapter 7 containsB(m,n) for m,n≤ 1. Chapter 8 contains the
final integral computation necessary for S2(3,3), C (m,n) for m,n≤ 1.
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Chapter 6
CASA= 1, MAISON= 1
6.1 Setup











Θ1(A)mΦ1(A)n dγ dβ dδ dα. (6.1.1)
6.2 A (0,0)











dγ dβ dδ dα.




























































































dγ dβ dδ dα.
Integrating the inner integral with respect to γ and rearranging the result in terms of


















(−δ 4+δ 3+2δ 3α−2αδ 2+2δ −2αδ +2α2−2α)β
2(δ −α)(1−δ )
+





ln(δ −β )+ β
2
2












































































































dγ dβ dδ dα.
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Integrating the inner integral with respect to γ and taking partial fractions of the result
















δ 3 (−δ +2)(δ −α)2
4(δ −β )(1−δ )2
− (δ −β )α
2
2
ln(β −αβ −α+αδ )
+





































(−2+δ )(δ −α)2 δ 3






























































































dγ dβ dδ dα.
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Integrating the inner integral with respect to γ and taking partial fractions of the result













−6δ 3+6δ 2+6δα+69αδ 3
−6α2δ 3−96α2δ 2+18δα3−27α3δ 3−12α3
+12α3δ 2−2δ 4+72δα2+39δ 4α+63α2δ 4
−27α2δ 5+11α3δ 4−90αδ 5+36δ 6α−12α2






6δ 2−5δ 4−6δ 3+24α2−30δα
−9αδ 3+141α2δ 4−12δα2−102α2δ 3−6α3δ 2
+5α3δ 4+42δα3+42αδ 2+45δ 4α−3δ 5−24α3








−21αδ 3+11δ 2+26α2δ 2−15δ 3+6δ 4
)
+
(δ −α)2 δ 3 (−12−27δ 3+11δ 4+12δ 2+18δ)
24(δ −β )(1−δ )3
+
(δ −α)3β 4
4(β −α)(δ −β ) ln(β )
+
1
4(δ −α)(δ −β )(β −α)
(
β 4δ 4+α4δ 4−4δα4β
−4β 4δ 3α−4α4δ 3β −2α3δ 3+2α2δ 3β +2α4β 2
+2α3βδ 2−4δ 2α2β 2+2δβ 3α2+2α3β 2δ
+6β 4δ 2α2+6α4δ 2β 2+2α4δ 2−4α3δβ 4






4(β −α)(δ −β ) ln(δ −β )
+
1
4(δ −α)(δ −β )
(
−α2βδ 4−αβ 2δ 4+4α2β 2δ 3
−2α3β 2−α3δ 4+2α2δ 3+β 3δ 4+4α3δβ
−6α3δ 2β 2+4α3δ 3β −6β 3δ 2α2+2δα2β 2
+4δα3β 3−4α2βδ 2−2α3δ 2+4β 3δ 3α
)
ln(1−δ )






































































−3δ 2α−2δα2+9δ 2α2−12α2−6δ 3+29α3








−3δ 2α−2δα2+9δ 2α2−12α2−6δ 3+29α3








−12δ 2−2δ 2α−3δα2+9δ 2α2+29δ 3−21δ 4
−6α3−6δ 4α+6αδ 3+3α2δ 4−9α2δ 3−18α3δ 2







−12δ 2−2δ 2α−3δα2+9δ 2α2+29δ 3−21δ 4
−6α3−6δ 4α+6αδ 3+3α2δ 4−9α2δ 3−18α3δ 2














(δ −α)2 δ 4
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Integrating with respect to δ and rewriting the result by taking partial fractions with





















































































































CASA= 3, MAISON= 1
7.1 Setup
Using limits (5.2.15) and (5.2.16), and grouping integrals sharing common limits for α





























































































































































































































































































































































































Integrating the three inner integrals with respect to β , combining, simplifying, and








































































Similarly we carry out the four-fold integration of remaining integral groupings
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Starting with the integration of the 3 inner double integrals with respect to γ and rewrit-















3δ −3δα−α−3δ 2+2δ 2α+α2δ +δ 3)β
(δ −α)(1−δ )
−




































Integrating the 3 inner integrals with respect to β , combining, simplifying, and taking



























































































− δ (−5+4δ )
12

















In a similar fashion we carry out the four-fold integration of remaining integral


















































































































































































































































































































Again, starting with the integration of the 3 inner double integrals with respect to γ and













−2δ 3+2δα+δ 4+3α2δ 2+4α2







δ 2 (δ −α)2
4(1−δ )2 (δ −β ) −



















2 (2−δ )(δ −α)2
4(1−δ )2 −





3δα−4α+2δ −δ 2)δ (δ −α)β
4(1−δ )2
+
δ 3 (2−δ )(δ −α)2
4(1−δ )2 (δ −β ) −






















4(δ −β ) +




2 (δ −β )
2
ln(δ )− α











Integrating the 3 inner integrals with respect to β , combining, simplifying, and taking











































δ 3 (−2+δ )(δ −α)2 ln(δ )
4(1−δ )2
− (δ +α)(δ −α)
3
4






4(1−α)2 (1−δ )2 ln(2−α−δ )

































(−163δ 3+80−268δ +26δ 4+324δ 2)
12(1−δ )2 ln(2−δ )






























−5910δ 4−3418δ 6+764δ 7+5994δ 5


























































































Similarly we carry out the four-fold integration of remaining integral groupings
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of (7.1.1) with m= 0 and n= 1, yielding






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Combining (7.4.1) to (7.4.10), simplifying and combining logarithms, and using dilog-






































































Starting integration of the 3 inner double integrals with respect to γ and taking partial













−81αδ 5−20δ 6+12αδ 2
+27α2δ −93δ 2α2+6α3δ +45α3δ 2
+13δ 3−35δ 4−12α3+144α2δ 3+4δ 7
−120α2δ 4−59α3δ 3+22α3δ 4−78δ 3α






36δ 6α+8δ 7+72αδ 2
−216δ 3α−108δ 2α2+303α2δ 3+8δ 3
+99α3δ 2−115α3δ 3−40δ 4+6α3+63δ 5
−6α2δ −36α3δ −255α2δ 4+72α2δ 5







−35δ 3α+14αδ 4+22α2δ 3−56δ 2α2
+9δ 3−12αδ +4δ 5−9δ 4−2δ 2
)
− (−5+7δ )(δ −α)
2 δ 2
24(δ −β )(1−δ )3
+






ln(β −αβ −α+αδ )
− α






























−27δ 3+78αδ 2−46δ 3α+8αδ 4−δ 2α2






42α2δ −6α2+9δ 3−27αδ 2




(−12+4δ 3−17δ 2+27δ)(δ −α)2 δ 3
24(δ −β )(1−δ )3
+






ln(β −αβ −α+αδ )
− α









































22α2δ −2α2−3δ 2+3δ −2
+5αδ −14αδ 2−2α+4δ 3
)
+
(−5+4δ )(δ −α)2 δ 2
24(δ −β )
+




































Integrating the 3 inner integrals with respect to β , combining and simplifying the re-









6−18δ 5+27δ 4−24δ 3+124δ 2−266δ +148
48(1−δ )
−
(−52δ 3+57δ 4−132δ −28δ 5+98δ 2+5δ 6+56)α
48(1−δ )2
−







































































































7632δ 9−37436δ 8+76146δ 7−84172δ 6




























































1440(1−δ )3 δ 2
(
76δ 11−318δ 10+498δ 9−346δ 8+9470δ 7















38δ 8−159δ 7+249δ 6−173δ 5+1225δ 4






Integrating with respect to δ and simplifying, we obtain





































































We carry out the four-fold integration of remaining integral groupings of (7.1.1)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Combining (7.5.1) to (7.5.10), simplifying by combining logarithms and dilogarithms,












CASA= 3, MAISON= 2
8.1 Setup





















































































































dγ dβ dδ dα.
Integrating the inner integral with respect to γ and rearranging the result in terms of























































Integrating with respect to α and simplifying, we obtain




Similarly we carry out the four-fold integration of remaining integrals of (8.1.1)



















































































































































































































































Combining results (8.2.1) to (8.2.7) and simplifying yields






















1− 2(γδ −αβ )− γ+β
2(δ −α)
)
dγ dβ dδ dα.
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Integrating the inner integral with respect to γ and rearranging the result in terms of













































































We finish by integrating with respect to α and simplify, finding,




Again we state the results of the remaining integrals of (8.1.1) with m = 1 and
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n= 0:

















































































































































































































































2(γδ −αβ )− γ+α
2(δ −β )
)
dγ dβ dδ dα.
Integrating the inner integral with respect to γ and taking partial fractions with respect














−5α2δ +10αδ 2+4α2−8αδ +2α
+2δ 2α2−4δ 3α+4δ 2−5δ 3+2δ 4−δ
)
+
(1−δ +α)(−3α+2αδ +3δ −2δ 2−1)β
4(1−δ )2















































































Similarly, we carry out the four-fold integration of remaining integrals of (8.1.1)




























































































































































































































































Combining the results (8.4.1) to (8.4.7) and simplifying yields


























2(γδ −αβ )− γ+α
2(δ −β )
))
dγ dβ dδ dα.
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Integrating inner integral of C1(1,1) with respect to γ and rearranging the result in















−81α2δ −63α3δ +195α2δ 2+71α3δ 2−213α2δ 3
+24α3+65δ 4−71δ 5−29δ 3−195αδ 3+213δ 4α
−38α3δ 3+114α2δ 4−114δ 5α+8α3δ 4−24α2δ 5






+123α2δ +59α3δ −29δ 2−38α3δ 2
+114α2δ 3−33α3−71δ 4+38δ 5+65δ 3
+201αδ 3−114δ 4α+8α3δ 3−24α2δ 4






14α2+8α2δ 2−20α2δ −16αδ 3
+α+38αδ 2−18δ 3+11δ 2+8δ 4−1
)
+





Continuing by integrating with respect to β ,simplifying the result, and taking partial


































(2δ −1)(4δ −5)(δ −α)2
24
ln(1−δ +α)



































































The four-fold integration of C2(1,1) to C7(1,1) is carried out similar to
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C1(1,1). We present following results











































































































































































































































































We summarize the results of the dissertation. Recall Definition 1.4.3
Sk(m,n) = Prob
(
A has a k× k saddle square
∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n(0,1)),
1≤ k ≤ m,n.
Goldman’s Theorem 1.3.2 states that for A∼UNm,n(0,1)
S1(m,n) =
m!n!
(m+n−1)! , m,n≥ 1.
Following the definitions of vminmax(A) (1.2.4) and vminmax(A) (1.2.1) and Thorp’s
second proof of Goldman’s theorem, we establish a formula for the probability that












∣∣∣ A∼UNm,n, r(A) = k),
1≤ k ≤ m,n,





pOpti (A)ui > v(A)





qOpti (A)ui < v(A)
∣∣∣∣ u1, . . . ,un iid un(0,1)),
A ∈M∗m,n(0,1).
We present in Lemma 4.1.1 the probabilities that A ∼ UN2,n(0,1) and A ∼










As a consequence of Lemma 4.1.1, we find the marginal distributions of Θ(A) and




Chapters 5 to 8 are devoted to finding our main result S2(3,3). Following from
















Θ(A)Φ(A) dα dβ dγ dδ .
(9.0.1)
In Chapter 5 we define integralsA (m,n) (5.1.1),B(m,n) (5.1.2), and C (m,n) (5.1.3),












Θ(A)Φ(A) dα dβ dγ dδ
= 72
(
2A (1,1)−A (1,0)−A (0,1)+A (0,0)
+2B(1,1)−B(1,0)−B(0,1)+B(0,0)




From the computation outlined in Chapters 6 to 8 we have the following results
A (0,0) = 1288 , (6.2.1)
A (1,0) = 1360 , (6.3.1)
A (0,1) =−493720 + 5pi
2
72 , (6.4.1)
A (1,1) =−110998640 + 25pi
2
192 , (6.5.1)
B(0,0) = 1372 − 14 ln(2) , (7.2.11)
B(1,0) =− 1216 + 172 ln(2) , (7.3.11)




8 ln(2) , (7.4.11)
B(1,1) = 2600920160 − 55pi
2
432 − 471008 ln(2) , (7.5.11)
C (0,0) =− 47288 + 14 ln(2) , (8.2.8)
C (1,0) =− 897743200 + 37120 ln(2) , (8.3.8)
C (0,1) =− 301914400 + 37120 ln(2) , (8.4.8)
C (1,1) =−2506986400 + 9112160 ln(2) . (8.5.8)
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APPENDIX A
N PERSON ZERO SUM GAME EXAMPLES
98
A.1 The Game of Rock, Paper, Scissors
A classic example of a two person zero sum game with three strategies is rock, paper,
and scissors: both players simultaneously show rock, paper or scissors and there is no
payoff unless the choices are different, in which case rock beats scissors, scissors beats
paper, paper beats rock. The player with the winning strategy receives a payoff of one
unit from the loser. This is a fair game with expected value zero to each player and
unique optimal mixed strategy of showing rock, paper and scissors each with proba-
bility 1/3. If either player chooses any other mixed strategy, then the other player can
counter with a mixed strategy which gives them a positive expectation. In the game of
rock, paper, scissors, both of the unique optimal mixed strategies require all three pure












A.2 The Three Person Coin Matching Game
A standard example of a three person zero sum game involves coin matching: all three
players simultaneously show heads or tails and there is no payoff unless two players
show heads (respectively tails) and their opponent shows tails (respectively heads), in
which case the two players showing the same face both give one unit to the third player.
Since the game is symmetric and the Shapley value is unique, the Shapley value for
each player is zero. This is obtained if each player flips a fair coin to decide whether
to show heads or tails, which is a Nash equilibrium point. If one player always shows
99
heads and another player always shows tails, then the third player will lose one unit
regardless of their mixed strategy. If the third player flips a fair coin to decide to show
heads or tails while the other two players always show heads and always show tails,
then this is another Nash equilibrium point for the game.
100
APPENDIX B
LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND THE SIMPLEX METHOD
101
Observe that the computation of vmaxmin(A) (1.2.1) requires one to
maximize min
j ∑i
pi ai, j subject to

∑i pi = 1,
0≤ pi.
Using the slack variable x, this becomes the linear programming problem
maximize x subject to

x≤ ∑i pi ai,1,
...
x≤ ∑i pi ai,n,
∑i pi = 1,
0≤ pi.
(B.0.1)





ai, j q j subject to

∑ j q j = 1,
0≤ q j.
Using the slack variable y this becomes the linear programming problem
minimize y subject to

y≥ ∑ j a1, j q j,
...
y≥ ∑ j am, j q j,
∑ j q j = 1,
0≤ q j.
(B.0.2)
Note that linear program (B.0.2) is the dual to (B.0.1), and by Dantzig’s simplex
algorithm [Dan1963], we can find the optimal strategies of each player and the value
of the game.
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In the case A ∈M2,2(R) the linear program (B.0.1) becomes
maximize x subject to

x≤ p1 a1,1+ p2 a2,1,
x≤ p1 a1,2+ p2 a2,2,
p1+ p2 = 1,
0≤ p1,
0≤ p2,
and linear program for (B.0.2) becomes
minimize y subject to

y≥ a1,1 q1+a1,2 q2,




If we assume A, with m = n = 2, does not have a saddle point (r(A) = 2),
then x is maximized at the intersection of lines p1 (a1,1−a1,2)+ p2 (a2,1−a2,2) = 0
and p1 + p2 = 1, and y is minimized at the intersections of lines (a1,1−a2,1)q1 +
(a1,2−a2,2)q2 = 0 and q1 + q2 = 1 , giving optimal strategies and game value alge-
braically:
p˜opt(A) =
(
a2,2−a2,1
a1,1−a1,2+a2,2−a2,1 ,
a1,1−a1,2
a1,1−a1,2+a2,2−a2,1
)
, (B.0.3)
q˜opt(A) =
(
a2,2−a1,2
a1,1−a1,2+a2,2−a2,1 ,
a1,1−a2,1
a1,1−a1,2+a2,2−a2,1
)
, (B.0.4)
v(A) =
a1,1 a2,2−a1,2 a2,1
a1,1−a1,2+a2,2−a2,1 . (B.0.5)
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